Secrets your AI agentcan use but never read.
Your keys live encrypted in the repo. hush npm run dev hands them to that one process — your coding agent can run it, and only ever sees [redacted:KEY]. No server, no account, no shared password.
npm i -g @omarei/hushmacOS, Linux and Windows (beta) · zero dependencies · MIT · other ways to install
That is the app itself — the page hush ui opens on your machine — running here on made-up keys. Suggestions, groups, the agent's activity: click around.
Works with the coding agents you already use, through MCP
- Claude Code
- Codex
- Cursor
- Windsurf
- Gemini CLI
- VS Code
- Zed
- Cline
How it works
Your agent asks. You approve. It never sees a value.
Keys live encrypted in your repo
.hush/vault.json holds ciphertext and public keys, so you commit it. Your own key never leaves your machine — on a Mac it is in the Keychain.
Your agent names a key
Through hush's MCP tools it runs a command with your keys, calls an API with one, or sends one to a host. No tool ever returns a value.
You approve, on your screen
A native dialog, or Touch ID — never a message in the chat. The process gets the value; the transcript gets [redacted:KEY].
In your terminal
Five commands. Then it gets out of the way.
hush init acmeA vault in .hush/vault.json: ciphertext and public keys, safe to commit.
hush add .env --as DevYour existing secrets, encrypted, as a set. Then delete the .env.
hush npm run devThe keys go into that one process, never onto disk. Its output is masked.
hush team add sam hush_pk_…Commit, and Sam can decrypt. No server, no invite email.
hush team rm samRe-keys the vault, re-seals every value, and lists what to rotate.
Or skip all five: hush start finds your keys, asks a few questions, and sets the project up — or let your coding agent do it.
✓ vault acme created at .hush/vault.json This file is safe to commit — it holds only ciphertext and public keys.✓ stored 2 secret(s) as Dev (dev) in this projecthush: using default, devconnecting with [redacted:OPENAI_API_KEY]✓ sam can now decrypt this vault commit .hush/vault.json and they are in — no server, no invite email✓ removed sam new key generation 2; re-sealed 2 value(s)What you get
Everything a .env did, without the plaintext.
The vault is a file in your repo
Each value is sealed on its own, with age's construction rebuilt on node:crypto. Key names stay readable, so a diff shows which key changed — never what to. The header is signed, and only an admin's signature changes who can read it.
"envs": { "dev": { "OPENAI_API_KEY": { "ct": "k6egPny2o9uFHSkiJzcUOWUZ…" }, "STRIPE_SECRET_KEY": { "ct": "k6egPny2o9uFHSkiJzcUOWUZ…" }, "DATABASE_URL": { "ct": "k6egPny2o9uFHSkiJzcUOWUZ…" },} },"signature": { "by": "99b889e5…", "sig": "rzm9ulD4…" }
Asked first, with your finger
Anything that uses a key asks on your own screen — a native dialog, or Touch ID on a Mac. Text in a chat can't click it.
hush wants to run npm test
for Claude Code, in acme-api, with 9 keys. Touch ID to allow.
Tools your agent can use, not read
hush's MCP server gives Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and the rest tools that name a key. None of them returns its value.
A teammate is one command
Everyone has a key pair. Adding someone wraps the vault's key for them; removing them re-encrypts every value and lists what to rotate.
Nothing beside it
No server to run, no account to make, nothing in node_modules: one binary, or one npm package.
Send keys where your app runs
hush push sends a key to 14 hosts through their own CLIs — on stdin, never on a command line — and refuses a value a CLI would quietly change. When you replace a key, the app tells you where it still needs to go. How it works
Status: early
Heavily tested. Not yet reviewed. Honest about both.
hush is pre-1.0, it has one author, and it has not had an external security review. The crypto is a standard construction — age's — rather than anything invented here, with a differential test suite against an independent reimplementation. That is not the same as someone qualified having looked at it.
- The brief for the review it needsWhat hush claims, and where each claim lives in the code.
- Can an agent get a value out?The red-team pass: every probe, and what it found.
- Security policyThe threat model: what hush defends against, and what it does not.
- Found a way in? Report it privatelyRather than in an issue.
Install
One file. Then hush start.
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/omarei-omoto/hush/main/scripts/install.sh | shOne file, no Node needed. Installs to ~/.local/bin without sudo.
The installer refuses a binary whose sha256 is not the release's, and checks its build provenance when the GitHub CLI is signed in. Then, in your project, hush start finds your keys, gets them in, and asks whether an AI assistant will be near them.